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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Tax policy is broken in Washington, D.C.  The recent “negotiations” 
surrounding the “fiscal cliff” are merely the latest play in the long-running 
theater starring the Democratic and Republican parties.  In crude terms, the 
Democratic position advocates tax increases and resists spending cuts to 
address the growing inequality in America.  The Republican position, in 
contrast, resists tax increases because of concerns about economic growth 
and advocates spending cuts to address the federal government’s exploding 
national debt.  The parties’ positions have become entrenched in recent 
years, with politicians increasingly catering to the extreme wings of their 
parties and eschewing compromise.  We argue that one way to break the 
impasse currently entangling tax policy is through pro-growth tax reform 
that reduces both inequality and budget deficits.  Although much maligned, 
the estate tax is an ideal place to begin this effort because it can address 
inequality concerns more efficiently than the income tax. 
Part II of this Article summarizes the data that show that income and 
wealth inequality has increased dramatically in the United States over the 
past thirty years.1  It also reviews studies that demonstrate that we should 
care about inequality because it contributes to a variety of adverse social 
consequences that persist across generations.2  There is also substantial 
empirical evidence that inequality has a long-term negative impact on 
economic growth.3 
Part III explores whether taxes can help to reduce inequality.4  Several 
studies show that federal tax policy has played an important role in reducing 
inequality.5  We argue that the estate tax is a particularly apt reform vehicle 
because inherited assets are a major source of wealth among the rich, and 
studies suggest that inherited wealth has a more deleterious impact on 
economic growth than inequality caused by self-made wealth.6  Although 
there are loopholes in the estate tax, it is still effective in moderating the 
amount of wealth that is passed from generation to generation.7 
Part IV examines the major criticism about the estate tax—that it 
discourages savings.8  This part shows that standard tax theory cannot 
predict the impact of the estate tax on savings and that the empirical 
evidence is mixed.  It also argues that the estate tax has a less harmful 
 1.  See infra Part II. 
 2.  See infra Part II.A–B. 
 3.  See infra Part II.C. 
 4.  See infra Part III. 
 5.  See infra Part III.A. 
 6.  See infra Part III.B. 
 7.  See infra Part III.B. 
 8.  See infra Part IV. 
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impact on savings than the income tax for two reasons.  First, the event that 
triggers estate tax liability—death—is ignored by taxpayers during the 
period of life in which they are likely to be most productive.  Second, the 
expected value of the estate tax’s effective rate is quite low during the period 
of life in which most taxpayers create wealth.  As a result, we propose that 
Congress restore the wealth transfer tax exemption level ($3,500,000) and 
top rate (45%) as in effect in 2009 and as proposed by President Obama in 
his 2014 federal budget. 
II.  INEQUALITY MATTERS 
A.  Societal Effects of Inequality 
As has been extensively chronicled elsewhere, it is indisputable that 
there is growing income and wealth inequality in the United States.9  For 
example, as shown in Chart 1, the Congressional Budget Office reports that 
for the period 1979 to 2009, after-tax inflation-adjusted household income of 
the top 1% of households grew 155%, the next 19% grew 58%, the middle 
60% grew 37%, and the bottom 20% grew 45%.10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 9.  See, e.g., JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY (2012); CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET 
OFFICE, TRENDS IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD INCOME BETWEEN 1979 AND 2007, available 
at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/10-25-HouseholdIncome.pdf; Thomas 
Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, Income Inequality in the United States, 1913–1998, 118 Q. J. ECON. 1 
(2003) (Mar. 2012 update available at http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~saez/TabFig2010.xls (2010 tables 
and figures)); Jon Bakija, Adam Cole & Bradley T. Heim, Jobs and Income Growth of Top Earners 
and the Causes of Changing Income Inequality: Evidence from U.S. Tax Return Data (Apr. 2012) 
(unpublished article), available at http://web.williams.edu/Economics/wp/BakijaColeHeimJobs 
IncomeGrowthTopEarners.pdf; Emmanuel Saez, Striking it Richer: The Evolution of Top Incomes 
in the United States (Updated with 2009 and 2010 Estimates) (Mar. 2, 2012) (unpublished article), 
available at http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~saez/saez-UStopincomes-2010.pdf. 
 10.  CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, TRENDS IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD INCOME, 
1979–2009, available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/Trends_in_ 
household_income_forposting.pdf; Chad Stone, Danilo Trisi & Arloc Sherman, A Guide to Statistics 
on Historical Trends in Income Inequality, CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES (Oct. 23, 
2012), http://www.cbpp.org/ cms/index.cfm?fa=view&id=3629. 
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CHART 1 
Source: Congressional Budget Office, Trends in the Distribution of Household Income, 1979–2009 
 
Similarly, Emmanuel Saez reports that, as shown in Table 1, a majority 
of the income gains over the past eighteen years has been captured by the 
top 1%.11  Over the entire period, 52% of the income gains went to the top 
1%, who experienced 58% income growth (compared to 6.4% income 
growth of the bottom 99%).12  During the Clinton (1993–2000) and Bush 
(2002–2007) economic expansions, 45% and 65%, respectively, of the 
income gains went to the top 1%.13  During the Obama economic recovery 
(2007–2009) an astounding 93% of the income gains went to the top 1%.14  
During the two economic recessions in this period (2000–2002, 2007–2009), 
57% and 49%, respectively, of the income losses were borne by the top 
1%.15 
 
 11.  Saez, supra note 9, at 3. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Id. at 4. 
 15.  Id. at 3. 
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TABLE 1 
Real Income Growth by Groups, 1993–2010 
 Average 
Income Real 
Growth 
Top 1% 
Incomes Real 
Growth 
Bottom 99% 
Incomes Real 
Growth 
% of Growth or 
Loss Captured by 
Top 1% 
Full Period 
1993–2010 
 
13.8% 
 
58.0% 
 
6.4% 
 
52% 
Clinton 
Expansion 
1993–2000 
 
31.5% 
 
98.7% 
 
20.3% 
 
45% 
Recession 
2000–2002 
 
(11.7%) 
 
(30.8%) 
 
(6.5%) 
 
57% 
Bush 
Expansion 
2002–2007 
 
16.1% 
 
 
61.8% 
 
 
6.8% 
 
 
65% 
 
Recession 
2007–2009 
 
(17.4%) 
 
(36.3%) 
 
(11.6%) 
 
49% 
[Obama] 
Recovery 
2009–2010 
 
2.3% 
 
11.6% 
 
0.2% 
 
93% 
Source: Emmanuel Saez, Striking it Richer: The Evolution of Top Incomes in the United States (Updated 
with 2009 and 2010 Estimates) (Mar. 2012) 
 
Edward N. Wolff documents the growing concentration of wealth in the 
United States from 1983 to 2010 in Table 2.16  In these years, the share of 
wealth of the top 20% rose from 82.3% (the sum of 33.8% plus 47.5% in 
1983) to 88.9% (the sum of 35.4% plus 53.5% in 2010): 
 
TABLE 2 
Distribution of Wealth, 1983-2010, Selected Years 
Year Top 1% Next 19% Bottom 80% 
1983 33.8% 47.5% 18.7% 
1989 37.4% 46.2% 16.4% 
1992 37.2% 46.6% 16.2% 
1995 38.5% 45.4% 16.1% 
1998 38.1% 45.3% 16.6% 
2001 33.4% 51.0% 15.6% 
2004 34.3% 50.3% 15.3% 
2007 34.6% 50.5% 15.0% 
2010 35.4% 53.5% 11.1% 
Source: Edward N. Wolff, The Asset Price Meltdown and the Wealth of the Middle Class (Nov. 2012) 
 16.  Edward N. Wolff, The Asset Price Meltdown and the Wealth of the Middle Class 58 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18559, 2012),  available at http://appam.confex.com/ 
appam/2012/webprogram/Paper2134.html. 
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The concentration is more pronounced in the case of financial wealth 
(excluding homes), as shown in Table 3.17  From 1983 to 2010, the share of 
wealth of the top 20% rose from 91.3% to 95.3%: 
 
TABLE 3 
Distribution of Non-Home Wealth, 1983–2010, Selected Years 
Year Top 1% Next 19% Bottom 80% 
1983 42.9% 48.4% 8.7% 
1989 46.9% 46.5% 6.6% 
1992 45.6% 46.7% 7.7% 
1995 47.2% 45.9% 7.0% 
1998 47.3% 43.6% 9.1% 
2001 39.7% 51.5% 8.8% 
2004 42.2% 50.3% 7.5% 
2007 42.7% 50.3% 7.0% 
2010 42.1% 53.3% 4.7% 
Source: Edward N. Wolff, The Asset Price Meltdown and the Wealth of the Middle Class (Nov. 2012) 
 
 The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
also collects detailed data on income inequality across counties.18  In Divided 
We Stand: Why Inequality Keeps Rising, the OECD documents the 
increasing income inequality in OECD counties, with the richest 10% in 
these countries having average incomes approximately nine times that of the 
poorest 10%.19  The United States has the fourth-highest inequality in the 
OECD (after Chile, Mexico, and Turkey), rising 25% since 1980.20 
As discussed extensively in a variety of sources, inequality has 
significant adverse societal consequences.21  In The Spirit Level: Why 
Greater Equality Makes Societies Stronger,22 for example, Richard 
Wilkinson and Kate Pickett argue that a variety of health and social 
 17.  Id. at 11–12. 
 18.  See Org. for Econ. Coop. & Dev., Income Distribution and Poverty at the OECD, OECD, 
http://www.oecd.org/social/inequality.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2012). 
 19.  Org. for Econ. Coop. & Dev., Divided We Stand: Why Inequality Keeps Rising, Country 
Note: United States, OECD, 22 (Dec. 5, 2011), http://www.oecd.org/unitedstates/49170253.pdf 
[hereinafter OECD, Divided We Stand]; see also Anthony B. Atkinson, Thomas Piketty & 
Emmanuel Saez, Top Incomes in the Long Run of History, 49 J. ECON. LIT. 1 (2011). 
 20.  OECD, Divided We Stand, supra note 19. 
 21.  For reviews of this literature, see James R. Repetti, Democracy, Taxes and Wealth, 76 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 825, 836–49 (2001) [hereinafter Repetti, Democracy, Taxes and Wealth]; James R. 
Repetti, Democracy and Opportunity: A New Paradigm in Tax Equity, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1129, 1150 
(2008) [hereinafter Repetti, Democracy and Opportunity]. 
 22.  RICHARD WILKINSON & KATE PICKETT, THE SPIRIT LEVEL: WHY GREATER EQUALITY 
MAKES SOCIETIES STRONGER (2009).  Wilkinson and Pickett use as their measure of income 
inequality the ratio of the income received by the richest twenty percent to the poorest twenty 
percent.  Id. at 17–18. 
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problems (life expectancy, math and literacy, infant mortality, homicides, 
imprisonment, teenage births, level of trust, obesity, mental illness 
(including drug and alcohol addiction), and social mobility) are worse in 
countries with greater income inequality.23  This is shown below: 
 
CHART 2 
Source: Richard Wilson & Kate Pickett,  The Spirit Level: Why Greater Equality Makes Societies Stronger 
(2009). 
 
Wilkinson and Pickett note that these adverse health and social problems 
persist regardless of the level of average income (richer countries do not 
achieve better outcomes).24  Moreover, they find similar results across the 
fifty states in the United States.25  As shown in Chart 3, health and social 
problems are strongly related to the level of income inequality in each state, 
regardless of level of average income:26 
 23.  Id. at 19–20. 
 24.  Id. at 20. 
 25.  Id. at 21–22. 
 26.  Id. at 22; see also Richard G. Wilkinson & Kate E. Pickett, Income Inequality and Social 
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CHART 3 
Source: Richard Wilson & Kate Pickett,  The Spirit Level: Why Greater Equality Makes Societies Stronger 
(2009). 
B.  Generational Effects of Inequality 
The adverse effects of inequality are especially pernicious because they 
persist across generations.27  Economists use an elasticity measure on a scale 
of zero to one to measure intergenerational income mobility.28  An elasticity 
of zero indicates that parents’ income is not at all related to their adult 
children’s income, while an elasticity of one indicates that adult children end 
up in exactly the same income class as their parents.29  A November 2012 
Congressional Research Service report30 surveyed the economic literature 
and concluded that “[e]mpirical analyses have estimated a strong positive 
relationship—about 0.5—between parent and child income in the United 
States.”31  This means that: 
[I]f the income of a child’s parents was 30% higher than the average 
income of families in the parents’ generation, then the child’s 
Dysfunction, 35 ANN. REV. SOCIOLOGY 493 (2009). 
 27.  LINDA LEVINE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42400, THE U.S. INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND 
MOBILITY: TRENDS AND INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS, available at www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/ 
R42400.pdf. 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Id. 
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income will be 15% above the average for his/her generation.  In 
other words, in the United States, about 50% of the (dis)advantage 
of growing up in a (low) high income family may be inherited.32   
 
Another recent study by the OECD measured the earnings intergenerational 
elasticity for the United States to be 0.47.33  Other economists using a 
different data set have found intergenerational earnings elasticity of 0.6, 
suggesting that a family earning half the national average income could 
expect to take five generations to reach the average income level.34 
The strong intergenerational effect may be attributable to the health 
issues that are associated with inequality discussed above.  In addition, 
inequality also impairs educational opportunities.  Many have noted that the 
children of lower income parents tend to perform more poorly in 
standardized tests and to obtain lower levels of education than children of 
higher income parents.35  Bruce Ackerman and Anne Alstott succinctly 
summarized the studies when they stated: 
The statistics are strikingly consistent.  Children who grow up in 
poor households are more likely to become teen mothers, to drop 
out of high school, to accumulate fewer years of education, and to 
perform worse on cognitive tests.  Children whose parents did not 
complete high school are much more likely to become dropouts 
themselves.  The adult children of the poor are more likely to be 
unemployed as young adults and more likely to be on welfare.  
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Org. for Econ. Coop. & Dev., Economic Policy Reforms: Going for Growth, OECD, 187 
(2010), available at http://www.oecd.org/centrodemexico/medios/44582910.pdf [hereinafter OECD, 
Economic Policy]. 
 34.  See Daniel Aaronson & Bhashkar Mazumder, Intergenerational Economic Mobility in the 
United States, 1940 to 2000, 43 J. HUMAN RESOURCES 139 (2008); Bhashkar Mazumder, The Apple 
Falls Even Closer to the Tree than We Thought: New and Revised Estimates of the Intergenerational 
Inheritance of Earnings, in UNEQUAL CHANCES: FAMILY BACKGROUND AND ECONOMIC SUCCESS 
(Samuel Bowles et al. eds., 2005); Bhashkar Mazumder, Is Intergenerational Economic Mobility 
Lower Now than in the Past?, CHI. FED. LETTER, No. 297, 3 (Apr. 2012); see also Emily Beller & 
Michael Hout, Intergenerational Social Mobility: The United States in Comparative Perspective, 16 
THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN 19 (2006); Russell W. Rumberger, Education and the Reproduction of 
Economic Inequality in the United States, 29 ECON. EDUC. REV. 246 (2010); Francisco H. G. 
Ferreira & Michael Walton, Inequality of Opportunity and Economic Development (World Bank 
Policy Research, Working Paper No. 3816, Jan. 2006), available at http://elibrary.worldbank.org/ 
content/workingpaper/10.1596/18139450-3816. 
 35.  See, e.g., OECD, Economic Policy, supra note 33, at 189–97; see also Repetti, Democracy, 
Taxes, and Wealth, supra note 21, at 837–40 (summarizing the studies). 
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Although there is significant controversy over the role of money in 
causing these divergent outcomes, the correlation is strong and 
widely acknowledged.36 
C.  Economic Effects of Inequality 
1.  Theory of Economic Effects of Inequality 
Thirty years ago, most economists believed that a trade-off existed 
between equity and efficiency.  It was often said that “greater equality of 
income can only be bought at the cost of lower productivity.”37  The 
conventional view was that inequality should increase growth because (1) 
the poor would be motivated to work harder; (2) the wealthy had a higher 
marginal propensity to save than the poor; and (3) only the wealthy could 
make the large capital commitment necessary for industrial growth.38 
As discussed below, however, the long-term empirical studies 
unanimously suggest that rather than help growth, inequality hurts long-term 
growth.  Several theories have been suggested to explain these empirical 
results.39  Some have argued that nations with high concentrations of wealth 
experience poor growth rates because such countries seek to redistribute 
wealth by using progressive tax rates and taxing income from capital.40  The 
theory is that the majority of voters will derive small amounts of income 
from labor and capital, and, therefore, will favor higher tax rates on higher 
amounts of income.41  The high tax rates will in turn discourage capital 
investment and impair growth.42 
 36.  BRUCE ACKERMAN & ANNE ALSTOTT, THE STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY 160 (1999). 
 37.  Huw Lloyd-Ellis, On the Impact of Inequality on Productivity Growth in the Short and Long 
Term: A Synthesis, 29 CAN. PUB. POL’Y (Supp.) S65, S65 (2003). 
 38.  See Philippe Aghion, Eve Caroli & Cecilia García-Peñalosa, Inequality and Economic 
Growth: The Perspective of the New Growth Theories, 37 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1615, 1620 (1999) 
(summarizing prior explanations for why inequality should be good for growth). 
 39.  See Repetti, Democracy, Taxes, and Wealth, supra note 21, at 836–40, for an earlier and 
more detailed review of these theories. 
 40.  Alberto Alesina & Dani Rodrik, Distribution, Political Conflict, and Economic Growth, in 
POLITICAL ECONOMY AND BUSINESS CYCLES 23, 34  (Alex Cukierman et al. eds., 1992) [hereinafter 
Alesina & Rodrik, Distribution]; Alberto Alesina & Dani Rodrik, Distributive Politics and 
Economic Growth, 109 Q.J. ECON. 465, 481 (1994) [hereinafter Alesina & Rodrik, Distributive 
Politics]; Giuseppe Bertola, Factor Shares and Savings in Endogenous Growth, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 
1184, 1184 (1993); Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, Is Inequality Harmful for Growth, 84 AM. 
ECON. REV. 600, 607 (1994) [hereinafter Persson & Tabellini, Inequality]; Torsten Persson & Guido 
Tabellini, Growth, Distribution and Politics 3, 11–14, in POLITICAL ECONOMY, GROWTH, AND 
BUSINESS CYCLES, supra [hereinafter Persson & Tabellini, Growth]. 
 41.  See Alesina & Rodrik, Distributive Politics, supra note 40, at 476–78; Persson & Tabellini, 
Inequality, supra note 40, at 604. 
 42.  Alesina & Rodrik, Distributive Politics, supra note 40, at 476–78; Persson & Tabellini, 
Inequality, supra note 40, at 604. 
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This explanation initially seemed to be supported by the findings of 
Alesina and Roderik that countries with high inequality have low investment 
in capital as a percentage of their gross domestic product.43  However, 
studies that included tax rates directly in their regression models found that 
high tax rates do not play a negative role.  Charles Garrison and Feng-Yao 
Lee included sixty-three countries (forty-five low income and eighteen 
industrial) in their study and found no support for the hypothesis that 
increases in tax rates adversely affect economic activity.44  Similarly, 
Roberto Perotti found no empirical evidence that taxes adversely affected 
the growth rate of the sixty-seven countries in his sample.45  Using the 
average marginal tax rate as the tax variable in his regression models, Perotti 
found that the coefficient for tax was positive and highly significant, 
suggesting that higher tax rates correlate with higher growth.46  There are 
many potential explanations for these findings.  Perotti suggests that they 
indicate that the countries with higher tax rates are engaging in redistributive 
policies that enhance social consensus and thereby increase productivity,47 
or, alternatively, that such countries engage in policies that increase 
investment in education.48  Not surprisingly, other studies have confirmed 
that the impact of taxes cannot be studied in isolation.  Instead, to determine 
accurately the impact on growth, it is necessary to analyze both 
governmental taxes and governmental expenditures because both can have 
positive and negative effects.49 
Other studies suggest that different sociopolitical and economic factors 
contribute to the negative impact of inequality on growth.  For example, 
several have suggested that the failure of countries with inequality to invest 
 43.  Alesina & Rodrik, Distribution, supra note 40, at 43. 
 44.  Charles B. Garrison & Feng-Yao Lee, Taxation, Aggregate Activity and Economic Growth: 
Further Cross-Country Evidence on Some Supply-Side Hypotheses, 32 ECON. INQUIRY 172, 172 
(1992). 
 45.  Roberto Perotti, Growth, Income Distribution and Democracy: What the Data Say, 1 J. 
ECON. GROWTH 149, 151 (1996) [hereinafter Perotti, Growth].  One study that has found statistical 
support for the argument that higher taxes are responsible for slower growth in countries with 
concentrated wealth, Reinhard Koester & Roger C. Kormendi, Taxation, Aggregate Activity and 
Economic Growth: Cross-Country Evidence on Some Supply Side Hypothesis, 27 ECON. INQUIRY 
367, 367 (1989), has been challenged as resulting from skewed data.  See also Garrison & Lee, 
supra note 44. 
 46.  Perotti, Growth, supra note 45, at 170. 
 47.  Id. at 171. 
 48.  Roberto Perotti, Political Equilibrium, Income Distribution, and Growth, 60 REV. ECON. 
STUD. 755, 775 (1993) [hereinafter Perotti, Political Equilibrium]. 
 49.  Richard Kneller, Michael F. Bleaney & Norman Gemmell, Fiscal Policy and Growth: 
Evidence from OECD Countries, 74 J.  PUB. ECON. 171, 188 (1999). 
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adequately in providing educational opportunities is a factor.50  Others posit 
that the presence of social unrest caused by inequality contributes to poor 
economic growth.51  Moreover, the difficulty of enforcing property rights in 
polarized societies also seems to be a mechanism through which inequality 
hurts economic growth.52 
2.  The Long-Term Empirical Studies (Fifteen Years Through Thirty-
five Years) 
There is substantial empirical evidence suggesting that inequality has a 
long-term negative impact on economic growth.53  A 1999 survey of the 
studies stated that “several studies have examined the impact of inequality 
upon economic growth.  The picture they draw is impressively 
unambiguous, since they all suggest that greater inequality reduces the rate 
of growth.”54  As shown in Table 4, this relationship still holds today.  All of 
the empirical studies that have examined the impact of inequality on growth 
in the long run suggest that high concentrations of wealth correlate with poor 
economic performance.55  Because wealth is often difficult to measure, most 
of the studies use concentrations of income as a proxy for wealth.56  Many 
economists believe that this may not affect the results because 
concentrations of income follow the same patterns as concentrations of 
wealth,57 but a recent study has concluded—after examining data from 
countries that collect data on both distributions of income and wealth—that 
the distribution of wealth in those countries is more concentrated than the 
distribution of income.58 
 50.  See, e.g., Amparo Castelló & Rafael Doménech, Human Capital Inequality and Economic 
Growth: Some New Evidence, 112 ECON. J. C187, C199 (2002) (when inequality is measured as 
education attainment, inequality correlates with poor growth); Oded Galor & Joseph Zeira, Income 
Distribution and Macroeconomics, 60 REV. ECON. STUD. 35, 35–51 (1993); Perotti, Growth, supra 
note 45, at 152–53; Kevin Sylwester, Income Inequality, Education Expenditures and Growth, 63 J. 
DEV. ECON. 379, 388 (2000). 
 51.  See, e.g., Perotti, Growth, supra note 45, at 173–75 (finding that social and political 
instability decrease economic growth); Carolyn B. Rodriguez, An Empirical Test of the 
Institutionalist View on Income Inequality: Economic Growth within the United States, 59 AM. J. 
ECON. & SOC. 303, 310–11 (2000) (asserting that inequality results in higher incidence of property 
and violent crime). 
 52.  Philip Keefer & Stephen Knack, Polarization, Politics and Property Rights: Links Between 
Inequality and Growth, 111 PUB. CHOICE 127, 128 (2002). 
 53.  For earlier discussions of this point see Repetti, Democracy, Taxes, and Wealth, supra note 
21, at 831–40; Repetti, Democracy and Opportunity, supra note 21, at 1147–52. 
 54.  Aghion, Caroli & García-Peñola, supra note 38, at 1617. 
 55.  See infra Table 4. 
 56.  See Aghion, Caroli & García-Peñola, supra note 38, at 1617. 
 57.  Id. at 1617–18. 
 58.  See, e.g., James B. Davies, Susanna Sandström, Anthony Shorrocks & Edward N. Wolff, 
The World Distribution of Household Wealth 1, 7 (United Nations Univ. World Inst. for Dev’t Econ. 
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TABLE 4 
Author 
Time Period 
between 
Measure Date 
of Inequality 
and Growth 
Negative 
Correlation 
between 
Inequality 
and Growth 
Positive 
Correlation 
between 
Inequality 
and Growth 
No 
Relationship 
between 
Inequality 
and Growth 
Ghosh & Pal (2004) 35 X1  
Tanninen (1999) 32 X  
Deininger & Squire (1998) 32 X  
Knowles (2005) 30 X  
Castello & Domenech (2002) 30 X2  
Alesina & Rodrik (1992) 25 X  
Alesina & Rodrik (1994) 25 X  
Birdsall, Ross & Sabot (1995) 25 X  
Bourguignon (1999) 25 X  
Deininger & Squire (1998) 25 X  
Persson  & Tabellini (1992) 25 X  
Perotti (1996) 25 X  
Chen (2003) 22 X3 X  
Keefer & Knack (2002)  22 X  
Persson & Tabellini (1994) 20 X  
Clarke (1995) 18 X  
De la Croix & Doepke (2003) 16 X  
Benjamin, Brandt & Giles 
(2012) 
15 X  
Sukiassyn (2007) 15 X  
Glyn & Miliband (1994) 10 X  
Banjeree & Dulfo (2000) 10 X  
Barro (2000) 10 X4 X4  
Barro  (2008) 10 X4 X4  
Panizzza  (2002) 10   X 
Partridge (1997) 10  X  
Thewissen (2012) 10   X 
Bagchi (2012) 5 X5  
Banerjee & Dulfo (2000) 5 X  
Brandolini & Rossi (1998) 5  X6  
Castello-Climent (2010) 5 X X  
Forbes (2000) 5  X  
Li & Zou (1998) 5  X  
Ravallion (1998) 5 X   
Voitchovsky (2005) 5 X8 X8  
Morck, Strangeland &Yeung 
(2000) 
3 X9 X9  
Gangopadhyay & 
Bhattacharyay (2012) 
0 X10 X10  
 
Research, Working Paper No. 2008/03, 2008), available at http://www.wider.unu.edu/stc/repec/pdfs/ 
rp2008/dp2008-03.pdf. 
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1. Found a negative relationship between initial inequality and subsequent growth in rural states, 
but found that inequality in urban states had no effect. 
2. Inequality measured as inequality in human capital. 
3. Found inverted U relationship.  When income inequality is low, further redistribution hurts 
economic growth.  When initial income inequality is high, income redistribution enhances 
economic growth. 
4. Inequality hinders growth in poor countries, but helps growth in rich countries. 
5. Inequality measured by concentration of billionaires. 
6. Found that changes in inequality (decreases or increases) slow growth. 
7. Found negative relationship using household data, but no relationship using county data. 
8. Inequality at the top end of the distribution is positively associated with growth, while 
inequality lower down the distribution is negatively related to subsequent growth. 
9. Concentration of billionaires who inherited their wealth correlates negatively with economic 
growth, but concentration of self-made billionaires concentrates positively with growth. 
10. Inequality has complex wave-like relationship to growth. 
 
In Table 4, all nineteen of the published studies that have examined the 
relationship of high concentrations of income to economic growth at the 
beginning of a period that extends fifteen years or longer have found that 
high income concentration correlates with poor economic growth.59  For 
example, Alesina and Rodrik found that growth rates in per capita gross 
 59.  Alesina & Rodrik, Distributive Politics, supra note 40, at 481 (1994); Alesina & Rodrik, 
Distribution, supra note 40, at 34; Dwayne Benjamin, Loren Brandt & John Giles, Did Higher 
Inequality Impede Growth in Rural China?, 121 ECON. J. 1281, 1283 (2011); Nancy Birdsall, David 
Ross & Richard Sabot, Inequality and Growth Reconsidered: Lessons from East Asia, 9 WORLD 
BANK ECON. REV. 477, 496 (1995) (finding long-term relationship between inequality and growth 
that is likely attributable to education); Francois Bourguignon, Growth, Distribution, and Human 
Resources, in EN ROUTE TO MODERN GROWTH: LATIN AMERICA IN THE 1990s 43, 58 (Gustav 
Ranis ed., 1994); Castelló & Dómenech, supra note 50, at C199 (when inequality is measured as 
education attainment, inequality correlates with poor growth); George R.G. Clarke, More Evidence 
on Income Distribution and Growth, 47 J. DEV. ECON. 403, 409–11; David De La Croix & Matthias 
Doepke, Inequality and Growth: Why Differential Fertility Matters, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1091, 1109 
(2003) (finding that inequality impairs long term growth and attributing this to inequality’s tendency 
to increase fertility rates); Klaus Deininger & Lyn Squire, New Ways of Looking at Old Issues: 
Inequality and Growth, 57 J. DEV. ECON. 259, 268–69 (1998); Keefer & Knack, supra note 52, at 
146 (inequality hurts long term growth because of insecure property rights); Perotti, Growth, supra 
note 45, at 159; Persson & Tabellini, Growth, supra note 40, at 11; Grigor Sukiassyan, Inequality 
and Growth: What Does the Transition Economy Data Say?, 35 J. COMP. ECON. 35, 49 (2007); 
Hannu Tanninen, Income Inequality, Government Expenditures and Growth, 31 APPLIED ECON. 
1109, 1112 (1999); see Sugata Ghosh & Sarmistha Pal, The Effect of Inequality on Growth: Theory 
and Evidence from the Indian States, 8 REV. DEV. ECON. 164, 175 (2004) (finding that inequality in 
rural states adversely affected subsequent productivity growth, but that inequality in urban states had 
no effect); Stephen Knowles, Inequality and Economic Growth: The Empirical Relationship 
Reconsidered in the Light of Comparable Data, 41 J. DEV. STUD. 135, 151–52 (2005) (finding that 
inequality, measured using expenditures by individuals, adversely affects economic growth in 
sample consisting primarily of less developed countries). 
  In contrast, the results of studies that have used shorter time periods are mixed.  For a survey 
of the studies, see Lloyd-Ellis, supra note 37, at S66 (2003); Repetti, Democracy, Taxes, and 
Wealth, supra note 21, at 831–35.  As discussed in Repetti, Democracy, Taxes, and Wealth, supra 
note 21, at 836, and Lloyd-Ellis, supra note 37, at S77, it is likely that the long-term studies reflect a 
more accurate picture because the factors that hurt productivity growth are most likely to manifest 
themselves over a long period of time. 
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domestic product for the period 1960 through 1985 in sixty-five countries 
that are democracies correlated negatively with the portion of national 
income earned by the top five percent and twenty percent of earners in 
1960.60  The more concentrated income was in a small group, the lower the 
growth rate in productivity.  Another study by Persson and Tabellini of 
eighty countries consisting of democracies and non-democracies found that 
an unequal distribution of income at the beginning of a twenty-five year 
period was “bad for growth in democracies,” while concentrated land 
ownership at the start of the period was “bad for growth everywhere” during 
the ensuing twenty-five years.61  A similar study of sixty-seven countries for 
the period 1960 through 1985 also found that unequal income distribution at 
the beginning of the period correlated with poor economic growth during the 
twenty-five year period.62 
Another study of nine European countries and the United States that 
divided data from the years 1830 to 1985 into seven twenty-year periods and 
one fifteen-year period (1970–1985) found that concentrated income 
distribution at the start of each period correlated with poor economic growth 
during that period.63  Similarly, a study found that income inequality in 1970 
correlated with poor growth for the period of 1970 to 1988.64  Another study 
used local panel data to examine the effect of inequality in rural villages in 
China on income for the subsequent fifteen years for households in the 
villages.65  The study found that higher inequality at the start of the fifteen-
year period resulted in lower economic growth.66 
One other long-term study has found a more complex relationship.  
Chen, using cross-country data for a twenty-two-year period, found that 
when income equality is low, further redistribution hurts economic growth.67  
In contrast, however, when initial income inequality is high, income 
redistribution enhances economic growth.68 
 60.  Alesina & Rodrik, Distributive Politics, supra note 40. 
 61.  Persson & Tabellini, Growth, supra note 40, at 18; see also Deininger & Squire, supra note 
59, at 268–69 (finding that concentrated land ownership in 1960 correlated with poor economic 
growth for the period 1960 to 1992). 
 62.  Perotti, Growth, supra note 45. 
 63.  Persson & Tabellini, Inequality, supra note 40, at 601, 607. 
 64.  Clarke, supra note 59, at 403. 
 65.  Benjamin, Brandt & Giles, supra note 59, at 1281. 
 66.  Id. at 1294. 
 67.  Been-Lon Chen, An Inverted-U Relationship Between Inequality and Long-Run Growth, 78 
ECON. LETTERS 205, 206 (2003). 
 68.  Id. 
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Some of the foregoing studies have been criticized because they used 
inconsistent or approximate measures for wealth distribution.  Wealth 
distribution can be approximated based on the distribution of pre-tax 
income, after-tax income or consumption.  Noting that many of the studies 
had mixed the types of measurement, Knowles in a 2005 study used personal 
consumption to measure the impact of inequality on growth over a thirty-
year period and also found a negative relationship in a sample of less 
developed countries.69 
3.  The Short-Term Studies (Ten Years and Less) 
Although the long-term studies have uniformly found a relationship 
between inequality and poor growth, the results involving periods of ten 
years or fewer have been quite contradictory.  A study of sixteen industrial 
nations found that nations with the greatest income inequality in 1980 tended 
to have the lowest labor productivity growth during the ensuing ten years.70 
Yet another study conducted by Barro, which used ten-year periods but 
included different countries, concluded that initial high inequality at the start 
of a ten-year period correlated with higher GDP growth during that ten-year 
period for wealthy countries, but correlated with lower economic growth for 
poor countries.71  In contrast, a study by Thewissen, which also used ten-
year periods from 1970 to 2009 for OECD countries, found no relationship 
between inequality and growth.72  The study used a different econometric 
method for testing the relationship than that used in the previously discussed 
Barro ten-year study.73 
 69.  Id. 
 70. Andrew Glyn & David Miliband, Introduction, in PAYING FOR INEQUALITY: THE ECONOMIC 
COST OF SOCIAL INJUSTICE (1994). 
 71.  Robert J. Barro, Inequality and Growth in a Panel of Countries, 5 J. ECON. GROWTH 5, 18 
(March 2000) [hereinafter Barro, Inequality]; see also Robert J. Barro, Inequality and Growth 
Revisited 6 (Asian Dev’t Bank Working Paper Series on Reg’l Econ. Intergration, Working Paper 
No. 11, Jan. 2008) [hereinafter Barro, Revisited].  Another study which used ten-year periods found 
that changes in inequality (either positive or negative) correlate with slower growth.  Abhijit 
Banerjee & Esther Duflo, Inequality and Growth: What Can the Data Say? 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 7793, June 2000). 
 72.  Stefan H. Thewissen, Is It the Income Distribution or Redistribution that Affects Growth?, 
11 (unpublished research memorandum, Leiden University Department of Economics, 2012.01, 
2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 2024856. 
 73.  The study used the least squares dummy variable fixed effects method of estimation to test 
the relationship using panel data.  This method is used in order to avoid problems of heterogeneity 
bias, that is unobserved variables correlating with the observed variables.  Id. at 6–8; CHRISTOPHER 
DOUGHERTY, INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMETRICS 520–22 (4th ed. 2011).  While this method reduces 
the heterogeneity problem, it is more sensitive to measurement error than ordinary least squares.  In 
contrast, Barro used the three stage least squares regression method.  Barro, Inequality, supra note 
71, at 11. 
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Some studies have started to use panel data for U.S. states to explore the 
relationship between inequality and growth.  An interesting study using 
panel data was published by Mark D. Partridge.74  He tested whether 
inequality in the forty-eight contiguous states affected economic growth by 
comparing the level of income inequality at the start of a ten-year period 
with the economic growth during that ten-year period for the forty-eight 
states.  He found that inequality was associated with greater growth, not 
lesser growth.75  Interestingly, he also found, however, that the larger the 
share of income by the middle quintile, the greater economic growth was 
during the period.76  He suggests that these two seemingly contradictory 
results might be reconciled by the fact that inequality creates economic 
incentives to earn more while having a large middle class creates 
socioeconomic benefits, such as stable social and economic environment, 
that also increase growth.77  A subsequent study of fifty states in the U.S. for 
periods of ten years by another economist, however, found no evidence of a 
relationship between inequality and growth.78  The author noted that small 
changes in the measure of inequality and the method used to regress the data 
could result in the estimated relationship between inequality and growth for 
this measure of time.79 
Shorter time periods have also been contradictory.  Using panel data for 
five-year periods, Forbes found a positive correlation between the state of 
inequality in the prior five-year period and the amount of growth in the 
current five-year period.80  She noted that this might be the result of using 
relatively short time periods.81  When she ran the same regressions for ten 
years the results were statistically insignificant, although the sign was still 
positive.  Voitchovsky also examined five-year periods and found that 
inequality at the top end of the distribution was positively associated with 
 74.  Mark D. Partridge, Is Inequality Harmful for Growth?, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 1019 (1997). 
 75.  Id. at 1022. 
 76.  Id. at 1025. 
 77.  Id. at 1030–31. 
 78.  Ugo Panizza, Income Inequality and Economic Growth Evidence from American Data, 7 J. 
ECON. GROWTH 25, 37 (2002). 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Kristin Forbes, A Reassessment of the Relationship Between Inequality and Growth, 90 AM. 
ECON. REV. 869, 872 (2000); see also Andrea Brandolini & Nicola Rossi, Income Distribution and 
Growth in Industrial Countries, in INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND HIGH QUALITY GROWTH 69, 87–89 
(V. Tanzi & K. Chu eds., 1998); Hongyi Li & Heng-Fu Zou, Income Inequality is Not Harmful for 
Growth: Theory and Evidence, 2 REV. DEV. ECON. 318, 327 (1998). 
 81.  Forbes, supra note 80, at 878. 
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growth, while inequality lower down the distribution is negatively related to 
subsequent growth.82 
Ravallion has argued that the aggregation of data may hide the effect of 
inequality in the short-term studies.83  He examined 6,651 farm households 
in 131 counties in rural China and found a significant negative relationship 
between the level of inequality in the county and the economic growth of the 
household (measured in consumption).84  He found that the greater the 
inequality at the start of a five-year period, the less the growth.85  Yet when 
he ran regressions for inequality and growth in the county as a whole, he 
found no relationship.86  He argues that the relationship between inequality 
and growth may be nonlinear and as a result become lost in aggregation.87 
Another source of controversy has been the measure of inequality.  Most 
of the studies discussed so far have used the Gini coefficient as the measure 
of inequality.  But this may be misleading.  A 2012 study by Sutirtha Bagchi 
used a different measure of inequality by comparing the amount of wealth 
held by billionaires in a country to that country’s GDP.88  Using panel data 
for five years, he found that the higher the concentration of wealth held by 
billionaires, the lower the annual growth rate in GDP.89 
Another study used another more refined measure of billionaire wealth.  
Morck, Strangeland and Yeung examined whether inherited wealth has a 
different impact than self-made wealth for a three-year period.90  They found 
that a country’s per capita GDP grows faster compared to other countries at 
a similar level of development if self-made billionaire wealth is a larger 
fraction of a nation’s GDP and slower if inherited wealth is a larger fraction 
 82.  Sarah Voitchovsky, Does the Profile of Income Inequality Matter for Economic Growth?: 
Distinguishing Between the Effects of Inequality in Different Parts of the Income Distribution, 10 J. 
ECON. GROWTH  273, 287–88 (2005).  An even more complex relationship was found by Partha 
Gangopadhyay and Biswa Nath Bhattacharyay,  Can there be a Wave-Like Association Between 
Economic Growth and Inequality? Theory and Lessons for East Asia from the Middle East (Ctr. for 
Econ. Studies and IFO Inst. for Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 3953, Oct. 2012) (finding 
complex wave-like relationship between inequality and growth). 
 83.  Martin Ravallion, Does Aggregation Hide the Harmful Effects of Inequality on Growth?, 61 
ECON. LETTERS 73, 75–77 (1998). 
 84.  Id. at 76. 
 85.  Id. at 77. 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  Sutirtha Bagchi, Does Wealth Inequality Matter for Growth? A Look at the Uber Rich, 
(2012) (unpublished student working paper, University of Michigan Ross School of Business), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2091834. 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  Randall Morck, David Stangeland & Bernard Yeung, Inherited Wealth, Corporate Control, 
and Economic Growth: The Canadian Disease, in CONCENTRATED CORPORATE OWNERSHIP 310 
(Randall Morck ed., 2000). 
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of GDP.91  The authors suggest that slow growth results from inefficiencies 
arising from entrenched corporate control by heirs, excessive capital market 
power by heirs that can restrict access by others, and barriers against outside 
investment.92 
4.  What is the Explanation for the Difference in the Long-Term and 
Short-Term Studies? 
There are two potential explanations for the difference between the 
short-term and the long-term studies.  First, different types of data are used.  
Panel data is usually used in the short-term studies and cross-country data is 
used for the long-term studies.  Panel data consists of information on several 
variables for several countries usually for a relatively short period of time.  
In contrast, the long-term studies generally use cross-country data that 
consists primarily of the measure of inequality for each country at the start 
of the period and the growth rate for the country during a lengthy period of 
time.  One advantage of the panel data is that it helps reduce bias that may 
arise from omitted variables.  As Forbes explains:  
[p]anel estimation controls for differences in time-variant, 
unobservable country characteristics, thereby removing any bias 
resulting from the correlation of these characteristics with the 
explanatory variables.  This technique does not adjust for omitted 
variables that change over time, but papers estimating the . . . 
growth model show that using panel estimation can significantly 
change coefficient estimates.”93  
Thus, the panel data may be providing a more accurate picture of the 
relationship between inequality and growth. 
The difficulty with this explanation, however, is that the short-term 
studies are, to date, quite contradictory.  As shown on Table 4, some short-
term studies suggest a positive correlation between inequality and growth, 
others a negative relationship, and still others a more complex nonlinear 
relationship where high inequality may be associated with slow growth in 
some situations and high growth in others.  The disparate results cast some 
doubt on the notion that the panel data is providing a more accurate picture. 
The simpler explanation for the contradictory short-term studies may be 
that that the short-term studies fail to capture the true relationship between 
 91.  Id. at 327. 
 92.  Id. at 362. 
 93.  Forbes, supra note 80, at 872. 
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inequality and poor growth because the relationship is not a short-term 
relationship.  As mentioned earlier, the long-term studies strongly challenge 
the conventional textbook maxim that “inequality is good for incentives and, 
therefore, good for growth.”94  The conventional wisdom was that inequality 
should increase growth because (1) the wealthy had a higher marginal 
propensity to save than the poor; (2) only the wealthy could make the large 
capital commitment necessary for industrial growth; and (3) the poor would 
be motivated to work harder.95  The long-term studies suggest that other 
forces may be involved.  The explanations with the most support—the 
failure of countries with inequality to invest adequately in education,96 the 
presence of social unrest,97 and the difficulty of enforcing property rights in 
polarized societies98—are also the explanations most likely to manifest 
themselves over a long period of time, not a short period.99  Indeed, Lloyd-
Ellis has suggested that the short-term and long-term studies may not in fact 
be contradictory.100  He argues that the incentive effect of inequality (that is, 
inequality motivates low income individuals to work harder) may be the 
dominant effect in the short term, while the other deleterious effects arising 
from inadequate education and social unrest may dominate in the long run.101 
III.  THE ROLE OF TAXES 
A.  Federal Taxes—In General 
It is clear that taxes have played a role in equalizing wealth.  For 
example, the federal income tax reduced inequality by 8.47% in 1978 and 
7.3% in 1998.102  A recent 2011 report by the Congressional Research 
Service found that in 1996, federal taxes (income and payroll) reduced 
income inequality by 5%.103  (Note that inclusion of the payroll taxes reduces 
 94.  Aghion, Caroli & García-Peñalosa, supra note 38. 
 95.  Id. at 1620. 
 96.  See, e.g., Galor & Zeira, supra note 50, at 35–51; Perotti, Growth, supra note 45, at 152-53; 
Sylwester, supra note 50, at 388. 
 97.  See, e.g., Perotti, Growth, supra note 45, at 173–75 (finding that social and political 
instability decrease economic growth); Carolyn B. Rodriguez, supra note 51, at 310–11 (asserting 
that inequality results in higher incidence of property and violent crime). 
 98.  Keefer & Knack, supra note 52, at 128. 
 99.  See Repetti, Democracy, Taxes, and Wealth, supra note 21, at 836; Lloyd-Ellis, supra note 
37, at S77. 
 100.  Lloyd-Elis, supra note 37, at S77–78. 
 101.  Id. 
 102.  James Alm, Fitzroy Lee & Sally Wallace, How Fair? Changes In Federal Income Taxation 
and The Distribution Of Income, 1978 to 1998, 24 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 5, 16-17 (2005). 
 103.  THOMAS L. HUNGERFORD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42729, CHANGES IN THE 
DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME AMONG TAX FILERS BETWEEN 1996 AND 2006: THE ROLE OF LABOR 
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the effectiveness of taxes in reducing inequality because the payroll taxes are 
regressive.)104  In 2006, federal taxes reduced income inequality by slightly 
less than 4%.105  This can be observed by examining the last row of the 
following Table 5.106 
 
TABLE 5 
Share of Income Received and Taxes Paid by Tax Filers in Various Income Categories,  
1996 and 2006 
 1996 2006 
 Before-Tax 
Income 
After-Tax
Income 
Total
Taxes 
Before-Tax
Income 
After-Tax
Income 
Total
Taxes 
Bottom 20% 3.0 3.6 0.7 2.3 2.7 0.6 
Second 20% 8.3 9.1 5.3 7.4 8.1 4.5 
Middle 20% 13.7 14.2 12.0 12.1 12.7 9.9 
Fourth 20% 21.2 21.4 20.0 18.9 19.3 17.6 
Top 20% 54.0 51.6 62.0 59.3 57.2 67.3 
Top 5% 29.0 27.1 35.6 35.0 33.5 40.9 
Top 1% 15.4 13.9 20.2 20.5 19.5 24.4 
Top 0.1% 6.6 5.8 9.4 9.7 9.1 11.8 
Gini Coefficient  0.532 0.503  0.582 0.560  
Source: Thomas L. Hungerford, Changes in the Distribution of income Among Tax Filers Between 1996 
and 2006: The Role of Labor Income, Capital Income, and Tax Policy 7 (CRS 7-5700 2011) 
 
Other studies have also shown that while federal taxes help to reduce 
inequality in the United States, the impact of federal taxes on inequality has 
been declining.  In 2011, Olivier Bargain et al. examined the impact of 
federal taxation during the period 1978 to 2009 and found that policy 
changes implemented in 1982, 1987, and the early 2000s contributed to 
inequality, while the reforms of the late 1970s, early 1990s, and 2009 made 
income taxes more redistributive and reduced inequality.107  The study notes 
that “[t]hese sub-periods can be broadly classified by Republican and 
INCOME, CAPITAL INCOME, AND TAX POLICY 7 (2011). 
 104.  Id. at 7–8. 
 105.  Id. at 7. 
 106.  In 1996, the Gini coefficient of before-tax income was 0.532 and taxes reduced it to 0.503—
a 5% reduction.  In 2006, however, taxes reduced the Gini coefficient by less than 4% (from 0.582 to 
0.560).  The study concludes that taxes played a greater equalizing effect in 1996 than in 2006 
because they were more progressive in 1996.  Id. at 8.  It is particularly interesting to note that while 
the average tax rate declined for filers in the top 80% of income from 1996 to 2006, filers in the 
lowest quintile (the bottom 20%) saw their average rate increase slightly from 5.24% to 5.68%.  Id. 
at 7–8.  The average rate increased for the bottom quintile because of an increase in the average 
payroll tax rate.  Id. at 8. 
 107.  Olivier Bargain et al., Tax Policy and Income Inequality in the U.S., 1978–2009: A 
Decomposition Approach 17–18 (Inst. for the Study of Labor, Discussion Paper No. 5910, Aug. 
2011), available at http://ideas.repec.org/p/ceswps/ _3402.html. 
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Democrat administrations.  Our counterfactual simulations also show that 
during Republican administrations average tax rates fell strongest for high 
income, but very little for low income households.”108  Similarly, a recent 
study by Cooper, Lutz, and Palumbo of the Federal Reserve Bank also found 
that federal taxes during the period 1944 to 2008 helped reduce inequality 
for wage income, although such taxes have less of an effect currently than 
they had previously.109 
B.  The Federal Wealth Transfer Tax 
The impact of the federal wealth transfer tax has been somewhat 
controversial for two reasons.  First, it is not entirely clear what percentage 
of national wealth is received through gifts and bequests versus having been 
created by the taxpayer.  As a result it is unclear what impact the wealth 
transfer tax would have on inequality.  Second, some have challenged the 
efficacy of the Federal wealth transfer tax in taxing those transfers. 
Inherited wealth constitutes a significant portion of wealth in the United 
States.  In 2012, 102 of The Forbes 400 Richest Americans were designated 
as having inherited their wealth.110  In 1999, 149 of the Forbes 400 had 
inherited their wealth.111  Economists estimate that anywhere from twenty 
percent to eighty percent of the wealth in the United States has been 
inherited.112  The differing amounts are attributable to disagreements about 
which types of transfers should be counted and the use of different 
databases.113 
 108.  Id. at 19. 
 109.  Daniel H. Cooper, Byron F. Lutz & Michael G. Palumbo, Quantifying the Role of Federal 
and State Taxes in Mitigating Wage Inequality 17–18 (Fin. and Econ. Discussion Series Div. of 
Research & Statistics and Monetary Affairs Fed. Reserve Bd., Working Paper No. 2012-5, Jan. 12, 
2012), available at www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2012/201205/201205pap.pdf. 
 110.  The Forbes 400 Richest People in America, FORBES (Sept. 19, 2012), www.forbes.com/ 
forbes-400/#page:1_sort:0_direction:asc_search:_filter:All%20industries_filter:All%20states_filter: 
Self-Made.  The website designates the source of the wealth of 298 of the richest 400 as being self-
made, suggesting that the other 102 were given their wealth. 
 111.  Dinesh D’Sousa, The Billionaire Next Store, FORBES, at 50 (Oct. 11, 1999), 
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/1999/1011/6409050a.html. 
 112.  See Henry J. Aaron & Alicia H. Munnell, Reassessing The Role For Wealth Transfer Taxes, 
45 NAT’L TAX J. 119, 131 (1992) (finding that 52% of wealth is inherited); William G. Gale & John 
Karl, Intergenerational Transfers and the Accumulation of Wealth, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 145, 154 
(1994) (finding that intergenerational transfers account for 51% of wealth when bequests are 
included in the transferred amount); Lawrence J. Kotlikoff & Lawrence H. Summers, The Role of 
Intergenerational Transfers In Aggregate Capital Accumulation, 89 J. POL. ECON. 706 (1981) 
(determining that 78% of wealth is received from parents).  But see Franco Modigliani, The Role of 
Intergenerational Transfers and Life Cycle Saving in the Accumulation of Wealth, 2 J. ECON. PERSP. 
15 (1988) (arguing that only twenty percent is inherited). 
 113.  For an analysis of the reasons that the estimates differ so greatly see Lawrence J. Kotlikoff, 
Intergenerational Transfers and Savings, 2 J. ECON. PERSP. 41 (1988). 
06 CARONREPETTI SSRN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/14/13  1:03 PM 
[Vol. 40: 1255, 2013] Occupy the Tax Code 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
1277 
As discussed earlier, the large portion of inherited wealth may be 
deleterious, since there is evidence that inequality attributable to inherited 
wealth is more harmful than self-earned wealth.  Morck, Strangeland, and 
Yeung examined whether inherited wealth has a different impact than self-
made wealth for a three-year period.114  They found that a country’s per 
capita GDP grows faster compared to other countries at a similar level of 
development if self-made billionaire wealth is a larger fraction of a nation’s 
GDP and slower if inherited billionaire wealth is a larger fraction of GDP.115 
Given that large amounts of wealth are received through transfers, the 
question becomes whether the federal wealth transfer tax is helping to 
reduce inequality.  We think that it is, because the federal wealth transfer tax 
clearly reduces the amount of wealth transferred by the largest estates to 
heirs.  In a recent article, The Estate Tax Non-Gap, Why Repeal a 
“Voluntary” Tax?,116 we showed that many of the assumptions underlying 
George Cooper’s seminal work, A Voluntary Tax? New Perspectives on 
Sophisticated Estate Tax Avoidance,117 are no longer applicable.  For 
example, estate freezes that involve preferred stock recapitalizations can no 
longer transfer untaxed value to heirs by failing to make dividend payments 
on preferred stock held by the older generation.118  Unless the preferred stock 
pays dividends, it is assigned a zero value, which means that the older 
generation is treated as having made a taxable transfer of all the value in the 
corporation.119  Similarly, qualified pension plans are no longer excluded 
from a decedent’s gross estate.120  We concluded: 
The result of these and other legislative changes since the 
publication of Cooper’s article is that taxpayers now can reduce the 
value of  assets subject to transfer tax in many instances only if they 
are  willing to assume the risk that the reduction may be 
economically  real and reduce the actual value of assets transferred 
 114.  Morck, Stangeland & Yeung, supra note 90, at 319. 
 115.  Id. at 327. 
 116.  Paul L. Caron & James R. Repetti, The Estate Tax Non-Gap, Why Repeal a “Voluntary” 
Tax?, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y  REV. 153 (2009). 
 117.  George Cooper, A Voluntary Tax? New Perspectives on Sophisticated Estate Tax Avoidance, 
77 COLUM. L. REV. 161 (1977). 
 118.  PAUL R. MCDANIEL, JAMES R. REPETTI & PAUL L. CARON, FEDERAL WEALTH TRANSFER 
TAXATION 767–71 (6th ed. 2009). 
 119.  Id. at 767–68. 
 120.  Id. at 333–34. 
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to heirs or,  alternatively, in narrow situations if they are willing to 
incur  some tax risk.121 
The evidence suggests that the current estate tax is in fact contributing 
to the breakup of large accumulations of wealth by encouraging charitable 
contributions and imposing a significant tax burden.122  As shown in Table 6, 
the largest estates transferred roughly one third of the gross estate to either 
charities or the Federal government in the 2002 to 2011 period, even with 
the increase in the exemption amount from $1 million to $5 million and the 
decrease in the highest estate tax rate from fifty percent to thirty-five 
percent.123 
  
 121.  Caron & Repetti, supra note 116, at 161–62.  Of course, others disagree with our 
assessment.  In this symposium and in other work, Edward J. McCaffery contends that the estate can 
be easily eviscerated with a modicum of planning.  See, e.g., Edward J. McCaffery, Distracted from 
Distraction by Distraction: Reimagining Estate Tax Reform, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 1235 (2013); Edward 
J. McCaffery, A Progressive’s Silver Linings Playbook: The Case for Repealing Stepped-Up Basis, 
138 TAX NOTES 969 (Feb. 25, 2013); Edward J. McCaffery, The Dirty Little Secret of (Estate) Tax 
Reform, 65 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 21 (2012); Edward J. McCaffery, A Voluntary Tax, Revisited, 
NAT’L TAX ASS’N PROCEEDINGS 268 (2000).  The data we present infra notes 122–26 demonstrates 
the role that the estate tax is playing in curbing concentrations of wealth, which we discuss in greater 
detail in Caron & Repetti, supra note 116, at 162–68. 
 122.  See infra Table 6. 
 123.  Authors’ calculations using data from INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., SOI TAX STATS—ESTATE 
TAX STATISTICS (2012), available at www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats-Estate-Tax-Statistics-Filing-
Year-Table-1. 
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TABLE 6 
 
Year 
Size of 
Gross Estate 
Effective Estate Tax Rate 
(Revenue as % 
of Gross Estate) 
Percent of Gross Estate 
Contributed to Charity 
2002 $5 to 10 million 16.64% 7.40% 
2002 $10 to 20 million 17.30% 9.40% 
2002 $20+ million 12.35% 22.30% 
2003 $5 – 10 million 16.69% 6.67% 
2003 $10 – 20 million 16.68% 8.92% 
2003 $20+ million 12.40% 15.24% 
2004 $5 – 10 million 16.76% 6.76% 
2004 $10 – 20 million 18.00% 8.12% 
2004 $20+ million 13.47% 17.62% 
2005 $5 – 10 million 15.99% 7.03% 
2005 $10 – 20 million 17.56% 8.51% 
2005 $20+ million 15.39% 24.30% 
2006 $5 – 10 million 15.23% 6.05% 
2006 $10 – 20 million 17.30% 7.80% 
2006 $20+ million 15.57% 17.83% 
2007 $5 to 10 million 14.06% 6.02% 
2007 $10 to 20 million 17.30% 6.53% 
2007 $20+ million 13.74% 21.24% 
2008 $5 – 10 million 12.96% 5.94% 
2008 $10 – 20 million 16.23% 7.49% 
2008 $20+ million 13.72% 27.27% 
2009 $5 – 10 million 11.92% 6.37% 
2009 $10 – 20 million 15.13% 6.96% 
2009 $20+ million 14.81% 15.78% 
2010 $5 – 10 million 8.93% 5.38% 
2010 $10 – 20 million 13.79% 7.41% 
2010 $20+ million 13.33% 14.50% 
2011 $5 – 10 million 4.09% 6.59% 
2011 $10 – 20 million 8.21% 11.94% 
2011 $20+ million 8.39% 24.55% 
Source: Authors’ calculations from Internal Revenue Serv., SOI Tax Stats—Estate Tax Statistics 
 
Moreover, as shown in Table 7, below, the effective tax rate, measured 
as a percentage of the net estate, was consistently quite high in the largest 
estates, ranging from 35.08% to 43.99% in the 2002 to 2011 period.124  
These numbers suggest that the tax is imposing a significant burden on 
accumulated wealth.  Indeed, if the tax were not imposing a burden, one 
would have to wonder why eighteen wealthy families contributed nearly 
$500 million dollars to bankroll a campaign to repeal the estate tax.125 
 124.  See infra Table 7. 
 125.  See Public Citizen, Spending Millions to Save Billions: The Campaign of the Super Wealthy 
to Kill the Estate Tax, 8, 11 (Apr. 2006) (unpublished report), available at www.citizen.org/ 
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TABLE 7 
Year Size of Gross Estate Effective Estate Tax Rate (Revenue as % of Taxable 
Estate) 
2002 $5 – 10 million 35.12% 
2002 $10 – 20 million 39.50% 
2002 $20+ million 39.91% 
2003 $5 – 10 million 32.99% 
2003 $10 – 20 million 36.95% 
2003 $20+ million 38.06% 
2004 $5 – 10 million 33.13% 
2004 $10 – 20 million 38.00% 
2004 $20+ million 39.95% 
2005 $5 – 10 million 31.76% 
2005 $10 – 20 million 38.84% 
2005 $20+ million 42.94% 
2006 $5 – 10 million 29.73% 
2006 $10 – 20 million 38.06% 
2006 $20+ million 43.99% 
2007 $5 – 10 million 26.09% 
2007 $10 – 20 million 35.69% 
2007 $20+ million 42.67% 
2008 $5 – 10 million 24.36% 
2008 $10 – 20 million 34.10% 
2008 $20+ million 41.57% 
2009 $5 – 10 million 23.07% 
2009 $10 – 20 million 33.19% 
2009 $20+ million 41.55% 
2010 $5 – 10 million 15.16% 
2010 $10 – 20 million 27.62% 
2010 $20+ million 39.03% 
2011 $5 – 10 million 6.92% 
2011 $10 – 20 million 19.23% 
2011 $20+ million 35.08% 
Source: Authors’ calculations from Internal Revenue Serv., SOI Tax Stats—Estate Tax Statistics 
 
Thus, it appears that the estate tax is playing a significant role in 
dispersing concentrations of wealth.  The remaining issue is whether the 
estate tax is economically efficient.126  As discussed below, we believe that it 
is likely that the estate tax is more efficient than the income tax because it 
has less impact on taxpayer behavior than the income tax. 
III.  THE EFFICIENCY OF THE ESTATE TAX 
The major criticism of taxing wealth transfers is that it reduces social 
welfare because it discourages savings.  This criticism is important since, as 
stated earlier, bequests and gifts account for twenty to eighty percent of all 
documents/EstateTaxFinal.pdf. 
 126.  See infra Part III. 
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wealth accumulation in the United States.127  The difficulty is that this 
criticism is not supported by theory or by the empirical evidence.  Theory 
does not predict the effect of a tax on savings, and the majority of the 
statistical studies indicate that taxes have little or no impact.128 
A.  Theory 
Theory proposes two opposite effects about how savings may respond to 
taxes.129  The first, the income effect, occurs where taxpayers increase 
savings to offset the effect of the tax.  The second, the substitution effect, 
occurs where taxpayers reduce savings and increase current consumption in 
response to a tax.  The result is that it is difficult to predict a priori what the 
effect of a tax will be on savings and investment by the donors.130 
In addition, a complete picture of the tax also requires analysis of the 
impact of the receipt of the gift or bequest by the heir.  Gale and Perozek 
have developed a model indicating that in situations where transferors 
reduce bequests in response to taxes, the transferees may increase savings to 
offset the shortfall.131  Thus, even if the estate tax discourages savings by 
donors, there may be an offsetting effect on heirs pursuant to which transfer 
taxes encourage heirs to save more.132  They suggest that “estate tax changes 
will typically generate opposing impacts on the donor and recipient,” and as 
a result, not impact savings.133 
The analysis is further complicated by uncertainty about what motivates 
taxpayers to make bequests and gifts.  There are several potential models 
 127.  See Aaron & Munnell, supra note 112, at 131 (finding that fifty-two percent of wealth is 
inherited); Gale & Karl, supra note 112, at 146; Kotlikoff & Summers, supra note 112, at 715, 721–
22 (determining that eighty-one percent of wealth is inherited).  But see Modigliani, supra note 112, 
at 36 (arguing that only thirty percent is inherited). 
 128.  For earlier discussion and review of the literature on the theoretical effects in the estate tax 
see James R. Repetti, The Case for the Estate and Gift Tax, 86 TAX NOTES 1493, 1500–01 (2000) 
[hereinafter Repetti, The Case for the Estate and Gift Tax]; Repetti, Democracy, Taxes and Wealth, 
supra note 21, at 858–60. 
 129.  See, e.g., B. Douglas Bernheim, Taxation and Saving (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 7061, 1999) (“There is no theoretical presumption that either effect 
dominates.”). 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  DONALD J. MARPLES & JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30600, ESTATE 
AND GIFT TAXES: ECONOMIC ISSUES 10 (2009); William G. Gale & Maria G. Perozek, Do Estate 
Taxes Reduce Saving?, in RETHINKING ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 216, 235 (William G. Gale et 
al. eds., 2001); Michael D. Hurd, Mortality Risk and Bequests, ECONOMETRICA 779 (July 1989). 
 132.  See Gale & Perozek, supra note 131, at 235–37. 
 133.  Id. 
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that likely apply to some taxpayers some of the time that can result in 
differing impacts on savings.  What follows is a brief summary of these 
models and the proposed effects on savings that have been suggested by 
Marples and Gravelle in a 2009 Congressional Research Service report 
applying the model developed by Gale and Perozek.134 
In the altruistic model, parents make bequests solely to help their 
children.135  The effect of a transfer tax on the donors is ambiguous because 
it is not clear whether the income or substitution effect will dominate.136  At 
the same time, Marples and Gravelle suggest that the estate tax tends to 
increase savings on the part of the recipient of the gift or bequest, apparently 
because it reduces the amount they receive.137 
In the accidental bequest model, taxpayers save for retirement and to 
meet unexpected contingencies.138  Only unexpended amounts that remain 
because of the uncertainties of life result in bequests.139  If bequests are 
accidental, merely representing amounts left over because the decedent had 
expected to live longer or because the decedent was saving for 
contingencies, estate taxes will have minimal impact on savings by 
parents,140 but again the heirs may increase their savings to counteract the 
decrease in the amount they receive attributable to the tax.141 
In the strategic bequest model, parents make bequests and gifts as 
rewards for service obtained from their children.142  The impact of a tax on 
parents making gifts or bequests is ambiguous because it will depend on 
whether the parents will save more (the income effect) to make up for the 
tax or instead substitute the services they had hoped to have received from 
their children with services from others (the substitution effect).143  Marples 
and Gravelle suggest that the estate tax will not affect the donors because the 
transfer really represents a payment for services that would have been 
subject to the income tax in any event.144 
Another motivation for gifts and bequests may be the joy derived from 
giving.145  Marples and Gravelle have suggested that, “If the parent focuses 
 134.  MARPLES & GRAVELLE, supra note 131. 
 135.  See, e.g., Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Social Interactions, 82. J. POL. ECON. 1063 (1974). 
 136.  MARPLES & GRAVELLE, supra note 131, at 10. 
 137.  Id. 
 138.  Gale & Karl, supra note 112; Hurd, supra note 131. 
 139.  See Gale & Karl, supra note 112, at 147. 
 140.  Bernheim, supra note 129, at 29–31. 
 141.  MARPLES & GRAVELLE, supra note 131, at 10. 
 142.  See, e.g., Douglas Bernheim, Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, The Strategic 
Bequest Motive, 93 J. POL. ECON. 1045 (1985). 
 143.  MARPLES & GRAVELLE, supra note 131, at 10. 
 144.  Id. 
 145.  Id. 
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on the before-tax bequest, the estate tax will have no effect on his or her 
behavior, but will reduce the inheritance and theoretically increase the 
saving of children.”146 
Lastly it has been suggested that bequests and gifts are made because 
the taxpayer has satiated all his or her consumption needs.147  In that case the 
tax would have no impact on the donor.  Moreover, Marples and Gravelle 
argue that the tax may increase the savings of the recipients again to make 
up for the reduction for the tax,148 or, alternatively, have no impact, 
presumably because the needs of the heirs may already have been satiated. 
After reviewing the various motives for bequests and the impact on 
heirs, Marples and Gravelle suggest that there may in fact be “a tendency for 
estate taxes to increase savings, not decrease it.”149  The following table 
summarizes their analysis: 
 
TABLE 8 
Impact of Estate tax on Various Models for Donative Intent 
Bequest Motive Effect on Decedent Saving Effect on Heir Saving 
Altruism Ambiguous Increases 
Accidental None Increases 
Strategic Ambiguous None 
Joy of Giving Ambiguous Increases 
Satiation Increases Increases or None 
Source: Donald J. Marples & Jane G. Gravelle, Estate and Gift Taxes: Economic Issues   10–11 (CRS 7-
5700 Jan. 27, 2009). 
B.  Empirical Analysis 
Only three studies have examined the effect of estate taxes directly. 
Perhaps reflecting the theoretical ambiguity about the impact on savings, the 
studies reach differing conclusions.  In a 1966 study, Seymour Fiekowsky 
found no evidence that the sharp increase in estate tax rates that occurred in 
the 1930s and early 1940s resulted in a decrease in the size of estates.150 
However, two more recent studies have found an impact.  A 2000 study 
by Kopczuk and Slemrod uncovered some evidence that the estate tax may 
 146.  Id. at 11. 
 147.  Id. at 9. 
 148.  Id. 
 149.  Id. at 10. 
 150.  Seymour Fiekowsky, The Effect on Saving of the United States of Estate and Gift Tax, in 
FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES (1966). 
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affect the size of estates reported by decedents on their estate tax returns.151  
The study’s findings suggest that taxpayers at age forty-five respond to an 
estate tax rate of 50% by adjusting their reportable net worth in such a way 
that the amount they will report at death is 10.5% less than what it would 
have been without the tax.152 
Another 2006 study by Joulfaian also found that the estate tax may 
cause the size of reported bequests to be 9.4% smaller than they would be 
without an estate tax.153  The Joulfaian study employed an interesting 
methodology to analyze the estate tax effect.  He converted the estate tax 
burden on bequests into a comparable income tax burden by applying a tax 
rate to the annual return on a taxpayer’s assets for the fifteen-year period 
prior to the taxpayer’s death that results in the taxpayer possessing at death 
the same amount of assets at death that she would have possessed after 
application of the estate tax.154  He found that viewed this way, the estate tax 
resulted in estates that were about 9.4% smaller than they would have been 
without an estate tax.155  Interestingly, he also found that when he included 
in his regression a variable for the estate tax itself, instead of the income tax 
proxy, no relationship was evident.156 
As Joulfaian, Kopczuk, and Slemrod observe, it is not clear whether 
their observed impact is the result of actual dissaving by taxpayers or the 
taxpayers’ use of valuation techniques designed to reduce the value of 
reported assets.157  This decrease may be explained by the use of valuation 
devices, such as family limited partnerships, which routinely result in 
discounts in the reported value of assets by thirty percent.158  In an analogous 
area, many studies of the effect of the income tax have found that high-
income taxpayers do not reduce their economic income in response to 
increased rates, but rather shift the income into tax-preferred forms.159  
 151.  Wojciech Kopczuk & Joel Slemrod, The Impact of the Estate Tax on the Wealth 
Accumulation and Avoidance Behavior of Donors (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 
No. 7960, 2000). 
 152.  Id. 
 153.  David Joulfaian, The Behavioral Response of Wealth Accumulation to Estate Taxation: Time 
Series Evidence, 59 NAT’L TAX J. 253, 266 (2006). 
 154.  Id. at 255, 260, 262. 
 155.  Id. at 266. 
 156.  Id. 
 157.  For descriptions of various techniques to reduce value see, for example, Laura E. 
Cunningham, Remember the Alamo: The FLP, 96 TAX NOTES 1461 (2000); Alan L. Feld, The 
Implications of Minority Interest and Stock Restrictions In Valuing Closely Held Shares, 122 U. PA. 
L. REV. 934 (1974); Mary L. Fellows & William H. Painter, Valuing Close Corporations for Federal 
Wealth Transfer Taxes: A Statutory Solution to the Disappearing Wealth Syndrome, 30 STAN. L. 
REV. 895 (1978). 
 158.  See Cunningham, supra note 157, at 1464–65. 
 159.  See, e.g., Alan Auerbach & Joel Slemrod, The Economic Effects of the Tax Reform Act of 
1986, 35 J. ECON. LIT. 589, 632 (1997); Nada Eissa, Tax Reforms and Labor Supply, in 10 TAX 
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Similarly, studies on the effect of tax incentives for savings found that such 
incentives do not increase aggregate savings, but rather cause taxpayers to 
switch saving into tax-favored vehicles (such as 401(k) plans) from taxable 
investments.160 
Indeed, most studies that have examined the effect of income taxes on 
savings have found zero or minimal impact.161  After reviewing the failure of 
taxpayer savings to respond to income tax rate changes in periods that 
experienced significant rate changes—1981 and 1986—two authors 
concluded that the “historical record seems quite clear in indicating little 
effect on saving of the aftertax real interest rate.”162 
There are strong arguments that a tax on wealth transfers should have 
less of an impact than a tax on income.163  The estate tax differs from the 
income tax in two significant ways.  First, death, which is the triggering 
event for the estate tax, is something that most people spend the majority of 
their lives denying.164  Although the reasons for the denial of death are 
debated,165 it seems widely accepted that we tend to ignore our mortality in 
conducting our daily lives.166  The propensity to ignore our mortality may 
POLICYY AND THE ECONOMY 119, 120–35 (James M. Poterba ed., 1996); Joel Slemrod, The 
Economics of Taxing The Rich, 27–28 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6584, 
1998). 
 160.  Eric M. Engen, William G. Gale & John Karl Scholz, The Effects of Tax Based Saving 
Incentives on Saving and Wealth 47 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 5759, 
1996); Auerbach & Slemrod, supra note 159. 
 161.  See Alan Binder, Distribution Effects and the Aggregate Consumption Function, 83 J. POL. 
ECON. 447, 471 (1975); Engen, Gale & Scholz, supra note 160, at 45–48 (tax incentives for savings 
have little or no effect on saving); E. Philip Howrey & Saul H. Hymans, The Measurement and 
Determination of Loanable Funds Saving, in 2 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 655 (1978); 
Jonathan Skinner & Daniel Feenberg, The Impact of the 1986 Tax Reform on Personal Saving, in DO 
TAXES MATTER? THE IMPACT OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1989); see also 
Bernheim, supra note 129, at 47 (for an excellent survey of the studies). 
 162.  Skinner & Feenberg, supra note 161, at 72.  But see Michael Boskin, Taxation, Saving, and 
the Rate of Interest, 86 J. POL. ECON. 53 (1978) (one of the few studies finding that income tax rates 
impact saving). 
 163.  For earlier presentations of these arguments see James R. Repetti, Entrepreneurs and the 
Estate Tax, 84 TAX NOTES 1541, 1542–44 (1999) [hereinafter Repetti, Entrepreneurs and the Estate 
Tax]; Repetti, The Case for the Estate and Gift Tax, supra note 128, at 1502–03. 
 164.  See Repetti, Entrepreneurs and the Estate Tax, supra note 163, at 1542–44; Repetti, The 
Case for the Estate and Gift Tax, supra note 128, at 1502. 
 165.  See, e.g., S. Solomon, J. Greenberg & T. Pyszczynski, Terror Management Theory of Social 
Behavior: The Psychological Functions of Self Esteem and Cultural World Views, in 24 ADVANCES 
IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 101–02 (1991). 
 166.  See, e.g., AVERY D. WEISMAN, ON DYING AND DENYING: A PSYCHIATRIC STUDY OF 
TERMINALITY 13 (1972) (stating, “[t]he primary paradox is that while man recognizes that death is 
universal, he cannot imagine his own death.  The belief is illogical, but persistent . . . . “); Sigmund 
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mean that taxpayers also ignore the estate tax for a significant portion of 
their lives.  To prove this assertion, ask yourself if your decision to work or 
make an investment today was influenced by the thought of your mortality.  
Probably not.  Also, how many businesses include the effective estate tax 
rate in their yield calculations?  We are not aware of any.  In contrast, the 
triggering event for the income tax, the recognition of taxable income, is 
something on which most persons regularly focus.  The result may be that 
individuals respond more strongly to income tax changes than to estate tax 
changes.  As the great economist Joseph Pechman explained: 
Opinions about death taxes vary greatly in a society relying on 
private incentives for economic growth.  Some believe that these 
taxes hurt economic incentives, reduce saving, and undermine the 
economic system.  But even they would concede that death taxes 
have less adverse effects on incentives than do income taxes of 
equal yield.  Income taxes reduce the return from effort and risk 
taking as income is earned, whereas death taxes are paid only after a 
lifetime of work and accumulation and are likely to be given less 
weight by individuals in their work, saving, and investment 
decisions.167 
The second reason that the effect of a tax on wealth transfers may be 
less harmful than a tax on income as it is realized is that, in any given year, 
the expected value of the estate tax is a function of the probability of death 
occurring in that year.  This means that during taxpayers’ most productive 
years, the effective estate tax rate is minimal.168  James Poterba explored this 
in a paper that attempted “to place the estate tax in context, so that it could 
be considered, along with taxes on interest, dividends and capital gains, as 
an investor-level tax on capital income.”169  To calculate the estate tax’s 
effective rate on capital income, he estimated the expected value of net 
federal estate tax liabilities for taxpayers of different ages in the 1995 
Survey of Consumer Finances. 
The expected value was a function of the taxpayer dying during the year 
based upon actuarial tables.170  He then divided the expected value of the tax 
Freud, Thoughts For The Times On War And Death, in IV COLLECTED WORKS 288 (1915).  
Economists have also noted that individuals tend to heavily discount future events.  David I. 
Laibson, Andrea Repetto & Jeremy Tobecman, Self-Control and Savings For Retirement, in 
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 91, 92–93 (1998). 
 167.  JOSEPH PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 225–226 (4th ed. 1983). 
 168.  See Repetti, Entrepreneurs and the Estate Tax, supra note 177, at 1541–42; Repetti, The 
Case for the Estate and Gift Tax, supra note 140, at 1502–03. 
 169.  James Poterba, The Estate Tax and After-Tax Investment Returns 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 6337, 1997). 
 170.  Id. at 12. 
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liability by an estimate of the return on household net worth to calculate the 
effective tax rate.  Assuming an average annual real return of six percent, he 
found the effective estate tax rate on capital income for persons in different 
age groups to be as set forth in Table 9. 
 
TABLE 9 
Age of Household Head Effective Federal Estate Tax Rate 
A.  Population Life Table 
 
<50 0.1% 
50-59 0.3% 
60-69 1.0% 
70-79 2.7% 
>80 19.0% 
B.  Annuitant Mortality Table 
 
<50 0.1% 
50-59 0.2% 
60-69 0.5% 
70-79 1.7% 
>80 13.9% 
Source: James Poterba, The Estate Tax and After-Tax  Investment Returns, Table 6 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6337, 1997). 
 
Table 9 presents two sets of estimates.  The first set is the estimated 
effective tax rate for different age groups using actuarial statistics from the 
Population Life Table, which is reported by the Social Security 
Administration Office of the Actuary.  The second set uses actuarial 
statistics from the Individual Annuitant Life Table, which describes the 
mortality experience of individuals who purchase single premium annuities 
from life insurance companies.  Poterba suggests that the probabilities in the 
Annuitant Mortality Table may be more accurate for individuals likely to 
pay an estate tax because that Table reflects life expectancies of individuals 
affluent enough to purchase a single premium annuity.171 
Note that using the Annuitant Mortality Table, the effective estate tax 
rates are quite small for taxpayers under age seventy.  The rates are .1% for 
taxpayers under age fifty, .2% for taxpayers between ages fifty and sixty, 
and .5% for taxpayers between ages sixty and sixty-nine.  These figures 
suggest that the failure of taxpayers to factor in the estate tax liability in their 
younger years may be based on more than the irrational denial of death.  It 
may also be a reaction to the low expected value of the effective rates at the 
 171.  Id. at 14–15. 
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time the taxpayers are generating wealth.  The greatest distortive impact of 
the estate tax would be on persons who are focusing on passing wealth to 
their families upon their death at the same time that they are generating the 
wealth.  But, the number of these persons is likely to be small.  Persons 
generating wealth are likely to be under the age of seventy, and, therefore, 
subject to a low effective estate tax rate. 
It is interesting to note that Joulfaian172 measured the income tax 
equivalent of the estate tax by looking at a fifteen-year period prior to death, 
which he reported to be a weighted average of 81.7 years of age for his data 
in 1998.173  As a result, Joulfaian was in effect examining the impact of the 
income tax equivalent for taxpayers in their sixties, an age during which 
Poterba’s study suggests taxpayers experience relatively low expected 
effective estate tax rates.  This may explain why Joulfaian’s results for the 
impact of the estate tax, as opposed to the income tax equivalent, found no 
impact.174 
In summary, theory is ambiguous about whether an estate tax will affect 
savings.  The few empirical studies that examine the estate tax suggest that 
the tax may cause the reported value of estates to decrease by about ten 
percent.  In contrast, the studies that have examined the effect of the income 
tax on savings suggest no effect.  There is a strong theoretical argument that 
the estate tax should have much less of an impact on savings than the 
income tax because of our psychological tendency to deny death and 
because the expected value of the estate tax’s effective rate is small during 
the period of life that taxpayers are creating wealth. 
If the estate tax is to be used to help decrease inequality in America, 
how should it be deployed?  Our take on the political environment in 
Washington, D.C.—now and for the forseeable future—is that attempts to 
“go big” and pursue dramatic reform have little chance for success.  The 
push in this symposium and elsewhere for wholesale changes in the form of 
inheritance taxes, wealth taxes, and taxation of capital 
gains/realization/carryover basis at death deserve more attention than they 
are likely to receive by today’s lawmakers.  Instead, we believe a “go small” 
approach has the greatest chance for political success and would win a small 
but significant battle in the long war against inequality in America.  
Returning to the estate tax law in effect in 2009 (President Obama’s 
previous position)—with a $3.5 million exemption and a 45% top rate—
would make a much-needed $72 billion down payment (over ten years).175  
 172.  See supra text accompanying notes 168–71. 
 173.  Joulfaian, supra note 153, at 261. 
 174.  See supra text accompanying notes 170–71. 
 175.  DEP’T. OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S FY 2014 
REVENUE PROPOSALS 244 (2013), available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/ 
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Tax policy perfection must not be the enemy of the tax reform good that is 
politically achievable.176 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Inequality has been increasing in the United States.  We should care 
about this increase because inequality contributes to a variety of adverse 
social consequences that persist across generations.  There is also substantial 
empirical evidence that inequality has a long-term negative impact on 
economic growth. 
For many decades, federal tax policy has played an important role in 
reducing inequality, although the impact of federal taxes on inequality has 
waxed and waned depending on the focus of elected officials.  We argue that 
the estate tax is a particularly apt vehicle to reduce inequality because 
inheritances are a major source of wealth among the rich, and studies 
suggest that inherited wealth has a more deleterious impact on economic 
growth than inequality caused by self-made wealth.  Although there are 
loopholes in the estate tax, it is still effective in moderating the amount of 
wealth that is passed within a family from generation to generation. 
The major criticism about the estate tax—that it discourages savings—is 
inaccurate.  Standard tax theory cannot predict the impact of the estate tax 
on savings and the empirical evidence is mixed.  Moreover, the estate tax 
has a less harmful impact on savings than the income tax for two reasons.  
First, the event that triggers estate tax liability—death—is ignored by 
taxpayers during the period of life in which they are likely to be most 
productive.  Second, the expected value of the estate tax’s effective rate is 
quite low during the period of life in which most taxpayers create wealth. 
Thus, a very strong case exists for returning the estate tax law to that in 
effect in 2009 with a $3.5 million exemption and a 45% top rate. 
 
Documents/General-Explanations-FY2014.pdf. 
 176.  For other estate tax reform proposals, see for example, Jeffrey A. Cooper, Time for 
Permanent Estate Tax Reform, 81 UMKC L. REV. 277 (2012); Miranda Perry Fleischer, Charitable 
Contributions in an Ideal Estate Tax, 60 TAX L. REV. 263 (2007); Miranda Perry Fleischer, Equality 
of Opportunity and the Charitable Deduction, 91 B.U. L. REV. 601 (2011); Phyllis C. Smith, Change 
We Can’t Believe In or Afford: Why the Timing is Wrong to Reduce the Estate Tax for the Wealthiest 
Americans, 42 U. MEM. L. REV. 493 (2012). 
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